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The British banking system has experienced significant stress in
the last decade or so. In this paper, the authors examine the sources
of this stress and study the reaction of British banking policy to
these changes. Like their American counterparts, the British are
striving to maintain a stable banking environment in the face of
increasing competitive pressures.
During the last two decades, the economic
and technological environment in which finan-
cial institutions operate has undergone impor-
tant changes. Improved communications,
electronic data processing and a volatile eco-
nomic environment have combined to chal-
lenge the extant structure of the financial
industry and its supervision and regulation by
banking authorities. In the United States, these
developments have resulted in the creation of
new nonbank competitors, essential elimina-
tion of deposit rate regulation, and weakened
prohibitions against interstate banking activity.
They have also contributed to serious strains
on and loss of confidence in portions of our
financial system.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the
recent changes in banking policy that have oc-
curred in the kindred financial system of the
United Kingdom. Despite many similarities,
British and American banking policy differ sig-
nificantly in the ways they achieve financial sta-
bility as well as in theirimpacts on the efficiency
of their respective banking systems. In partic-
ular, British policymakers historically have re-
lied more heavily on "self-regulation" by the
banking industry, and have tolerated pricing
cartels and restrictions on entry. The high levels
of concentration in the British banking sector
also facilitated a supervisory approach that,
while more informal than that practiced in the
United States, was also more intimate. Fur-
thermore, the British approach involved banks
more directly in national economic policy ini-
tiatives.
By the 1970s, British policy had stimulated
the growth of nonbank competition that was
undiversified and entirely unsupervised by any
regulatory authority. The failure of these fringe
institutions precipitated a crisis of confidence
that threatened the entire British banking sys-
tem.
The British experience illustrates the
strength of natural competitive forces, particu-TABLE A.2
Estimates of Percentage Change
in GNP Price Deflator (Annual Rate)**
p( 15) p(15) p(45) p(75) P
1976:1 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.9
1976:2 4.4 5.0 5.4 5.5 3.8
1976:3 5.0 4.4 4.2 4.5 5.1
1976:4 6.4 6.5 6.0 6.0 6.7
1977:1 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.7 5.9
1977:2 6.5 7.1 7.5 7.6 7.1
1977:3 5.4 5.3 5.1 5.1 6.3
1977:4 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.3 6.5
1978:1 7.5 6.8 6.8 6.8 5.5
1978:2 8.4 10.7 11.5 11.8 12.0
1978:3 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.2 9.0
1978:4 8.9 8.6 8.6 8.7 9.7
1979:1 9.1 8.6 8.8 8.9 8.7
1979:2 9.8 9.1 8.6 8.7 8.4
1979:3 8.2 7.9 7.7 8.3 8.8
1979:4 8.6 8.3 8.2 7.9 7.4
1980:1 10.2 9.4 9.2 9.4 9.8
1980:2 9.7 9.3 9.5 9.5 9.9
1980:3 10.1 9.7 10.5 9.4 8.9
1980:4 12.1 11.7 11.2 11.1 11.7
1981:1 8.3 8.4 10.9 10.6 12.1
1981:2 6.2 5.9 6.5 6.3 6.5
1981:3 9.3 9.4 9.6 10.0 10.3
1981:4 8.3 7.9 8.9 9.1 7.9
1982:1 4.5 3.5 3.4 3.7 4.4
1982:2 5.0 5.4 4.9 4.7 5.5
1982:3 6.6 5.4 4.7 5.1 3.4
1982:4 4.4 4.2 3.6 3.6 3.4
1983:1 4.5 6.0 5.8 5.7 5.2
1983:2 4.3 4.8 3.8 3.6 2.9
1983:3 3.5 3.7 3.5 3.9 3.3
1983:4 4.2 4.1 4.4 4.1 4.7
*'Variables are defined analogously to those in Table A.1 (i.e., p( 15) is the flash estimate of p). The percentage
change in the GNP Price Deflator was obtained by subtracting the change in Constant Dollar GNP from the change in
Current Dollar GNP.
REFERENCES
Malinvaud, E. Statistical Methods of Econometrics. North
Holland, 1970.
Mankiw, N. Gregory, David E. Runkle, and Matthew D.
Shapiro. "Are Preliminary Announcements of the
Money Stock Rational Forecasts?" Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, 14(1) (July 1984).
Trevor, Robert G. Rational Expectations and Economic
Modeling: Four Essays in Macroeconomics and In-
ternational Finance. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Princeton University, 1985.
13larly in an environment where implicit central
bank protection is provided asymmetrically to
various financial institutions and bank restric-
tions on entry and portfolio composition exist.
This interpretation is supported by recent
changes in British banking policy that would
appear to be moving Britain toward a system
with relatively free entry, but also one with
more intensive supervision and examination of
financial institutions.
We turn now to a brief review of the evolu-
tion of the British banking structure. This dis-
cussion is followed by an analysis of current
efforts to reform banking policy. The paper
concludes with a brief summary and interpre-
tation of recent events in British banking.
I. The Structure and Evolution of the British Banking System
Examining the evolution of British banking
institutions inthe context ofchanging economic
policy illustrates how regulation, market struc-
ture, and the performance of the banking sys-
tem interacted in a way that resulted in
considerable instability. The following discus-
sion does not attempt to encompass the range
of institutions making up the British banking
system, but rather, focuses on those banking
entities salient to the main issues of this paper.
These entities include the "clearing banks"
(roughly analogous to U.S. commercial banks),
the "building societies" (resembling mutual
savings banks in the U.S.), and, finally, the
fringe group of bank-like financial organiza-
tions known as the "secondary banks." To-
gether, these three groups account for over 75
percent of total deposits in the U. K., although
they do face some competition from various
other British banking institutions.1
The London Clearing Banks
Before the early 1960s, clearing banks were
overwhelmingly the most important providers
of demand deposits in the British banking sys-
tem. They continue to control about 35 percent
of total U.K. deposits, and are active in both
commercial and consumer lending.2 The group
derives its name from its exclusive ownership
and control ofthe nation's major funds transfer
and check clearing system.3 This privilege has
restrained competition from other institutions
for checkable deposits, or "current accounts"
as they are known in the U.K.
The clearing bank industry historically has
been highly concentrated. Indeed, today, only
4 major London banking groups own or effec-
tively control almost all the clearing banks and
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their subsidiaries.4 It was not until relatively re-
cently that British banking policy addressed the
problems stemming from this market structure.
Historically, the Bank of England only grad-
ually assumed the supervisory and regulatory
functions of a modern central bank. The con-
centrated nature of the clearing bank industry
fostered the development of a supervisory sys-
tem that was informal and therefore flexible.
Moreover, within this system, the Bank ofEng-
land may have benefitted from according the
clearing banks a privileged competitive position
in exchange for their cooperation in carrying
out the Bank's monetary and other policy ob-
jectives.5
The concentrated character of the clearing
bank industry is due to a history of legislative
barriers to entry imposed to a significant degree
by the Bank of England. As a result of these
barriers, very few new banks formed after the
mid-19th century.6 Instead, there was a period
of extensive amalgamation of smaller banks.
Protected from competition from new banks,
competition between existing banks took the
form of rapid branching.
Through the first half of this century, the
Bank of England essentially ignored the effects
of the clearing bank cartel's collusive pricing
and monopoly of the clearing mechanism on
the British banking industry, including the pos-
sibility that the clearing banks enjoyed supra-
normal profits.7 The quid pro quo of this
arrangement was that the banks would comply
with the Bank of England's "requests" regard-
ing monetary and other policy objectives with-
out requiring explicit, formal regulation.8
Supervision of the clearing banks was like-
wise simplified due to the concentration of theindustry. No explicit legislation regarding bank
supervision was perceived to be necessary given
the overall stability ofthe industry. Instead, the
Bank generally relied on "moral suasion" to in-
fluence the clearing banks, as well as the im-
plicit threat of refusing to maintain a bank's
account. Consequently, supervisory efforts con-
sisted of relatively informal discussions with
senior management about the nature and qual-
ity of its business, including its management,
and an annual review of the banks' accounts.9
Before 1979, Britain lacked an equivalent to
U.S. deposit insurance. However, clearing
bank control of the nation's funds transfer and
clearing mechanism, the general intimacy be-
tween the Bank of England and the clearing
banks, and several historical precedents con-
tributed to the general perception that, in the
event of a major financial crisis, the Bank
would step in to uphold the continued opera-
tion of the clearing banks.
Until the early 1960s, the British banking sys-
tem was highly concentrated and dominated by
a cartel of clearing banks enjoying oligopolistic
benefits. This situation resulted in a banking
industry that, for many years, was stable and
easy to control from the point of view of the
Bank of England.10 However, during the 1960s
and 1970s, a number of interrelated factors up-
set the status quo and jeopardized the stability
of the system. In the postwar era, restrictions
on the dearing banks, including lending and
interest rate ceilings and portfolio restrictions,
in combination with rising interest rates and a
higher standard of living resulted in the emer-
gence of lucrative banking opportunities for
other institutions. Consequently, despite the
relatively protected status of the clearing
banks, competition emerged from several quar-
ters.
Building Societies
At present, building societies comprise im-
portant competition for the clearing banks,
controlling some 33 percent of total deposit li-
abilities. They were formed during the indus-
trial revolution to provide a mechanism for
financing the home purchases ofworkers drawn
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to new industrial centers. They were then, and
remain today, "mutual societies" in that most
of their liabilities take the form of "shares."
This arrangement leaves management author-
ity, at least in concept, in the hands of deposi-
tors. 11 Since their formation, they have been
viewed by British policymakers as a mechanism
for promoting and financing home ownership
in the United Kingdom. Their assets have con-
sisted, therefore, primarily of mortgage loans.
Competition within the building society in-
dustry has been more vigorous than that among
clearing banks throughout the societies' history.
A cartel was formed in the 1930s to stabilize
the industry, but after some 50 years of opera-
tion, the maverick behavior of members dis-
abled its effectiveness; the cartel was
dismantled in 1984. 12 However, the number of
building societies in the U.K. has fallen sharply
since the turn of the century and market share
has become increasingly concentrated in a few
firms from a five-firm concentration ratio of 39
percent in 1930 to 55 percent in 1983. The larg~
est society now has over 20 percent of total in-
dustry assets. However, unlike the case of the
clearing banks, the building society sector did
not face significant barriers to entry. Conse-
quently, some 210 institutions exist today with
extensive branch networks throughout the
United Kingdom.
Overall, the building societies played a rela-
tively minor role in the British financial indus-
try until the 1950s and 1960s when reform of
the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing
increased the demand for residential mort-
gages. The combined effect of increased resi-
dential mortgage demand, tax advantages, and
an ability to compete for deposits at competi-
tive rates then stimulated rapid growth in build-
ing societies. Their share of total deposits
relative to the clearing banks rose from less
than 30 percent in 1955 to almost 90 percent in
1985.
Unlike their American analogs in the thrift
industry, British building societies were not
subject to Regulation Q-type deposit rate ceil-
ings. They were thus able to pay shareholders
and depositors returns consistent with those en-
joyed elsewhere in the marketplace. The clear-ing banks hadtied rates ofinterest paid on non-
checkable deposits to the Bank rate, which was
frequently lower than rates paid elsewhere.
The building societies also received more fa-
vorable tax treatment than the clearing banks
in that depositors received their interest on an
after-tax basis. The tax on interest earnings was
paid at a so-called "composite" rate by the
building society, thus no further tax obligation
was incurred by resident depositors. Since the
composite rate, historically, has been lower
than the very high marginal personal tax rates
in the U.K., building societies were very at-
tractive to retail depositors. In addition, the so-
cieties have been insulated somewhat better
from interest rate and credit risk than their
American counterparts because of their policy
of making adjustable rate mortgage loans and
government policies which provide funds for
mortgage payments to the unemployed. Build-
ing societies are supervised by the "Chief Reg-
istrar of Friendly Societies."
Despite relative advantages such as the abil-
ity to pay market rates of interest and prefer-
ential tax treatment, the extent to which the
building societies were able to compete with the
clearing banks has been restrained. Restrictions
on the composition of building society assets
did not permit deposit account overdrafts-a
major mechanism in the British system for
making loans-and thereby precluded societies
from offering "checkable" current accounts. In
addition, the clearing banks' monopoly of the
clearing and settlement mechanism has also
impeded building societies from offering effec-
tive competition.
The Secondary Banking Sector
The fringe financial institutions in the British
banking system, frequently referred to as "the
secondary banks", did not become important
until the post-war period when restrictions on
clearing banks induced the development of
other institutions to take advantage of new and
unexploited banking opportunities in the then
generally favorable economic climate.
During the 1950s and early 1960s, the Bank
of England discouraged clearing banks from
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lending to individuals or to property interests,
hoping thereby to channel investment into the
industrial sector. Meanwhile, post-war personal
income was rising and generating more demand
for consumer goods. The secondary banks
emerged during this time to exploit the new
lending markets. In general, they engaged in
activities such as the finance of auto and house-
hold goods purchases and equipment leasing to
businesses. They freely obtained deposits from
the newly developing wholesale money mar-
kets. Andgenerally higher market interest rates
combined with interest ceilings on clearing
bank deposit accounts induced depositors to
seek higher yielding deposit alternatives from
them.
By the 1960s, as lending and other restric-
tions continued to handicap the clearing banks,
the secondary banking sector presented in-
creasingly strong competition. However, the
rapid development of this fringe banking sec-
tor, generated by restraints elsewhere in the in-
dustry, introduced elements of risk that
threatened the traditional stability of the Brit-
ish banking system.
First, these institutions were largely undiv-
ersified, lending only to the narrow sectors to
which they had access. Consequently, these
banks were left with more risky activities and
engaged in more speculative ventures than the
clearing banks had been wont to do. Whereas
the clearing banks had traditionally eschewed
investment in equity shares ofothercompanies,
the new financiers participated actively in hold-
ing and dealing in shares, takeover activities
and investment management.
A second element of risk stemmed from the
complete lack of supervision of these institu-
tions. Growth in this new banking sector oc-
curred so rapidly that the supervisory scope of
the Bank of England was not expanded to in-
corporate it. Neither were codified standards of
prudential management proposed. 13 Finally,
unlike the clearing banks, there was no entity
to function as a lender of last resort to the sec-
ondary banks; the money placed through the
wholesale markets was (and is) entirely unse-
cured.The Crisis
In 1971, the Competition and Credit Control
policy was introduced that loosened many of
the lending restrictions on clearing banks. This
act encouraged the clearing banks to compete
with other financial institutions as well as
among themselves in previously restricted mar-
kets at competitive interest rates. The Bank of
England had expected the number of fringe fi-
nancial institutions to contract under this in-
creased competition and thereby free more
investment credit for industrial uses. Overall
lending did skyrocket as a result, but the clear-
ing banks also began to compete with the sec-
ondary banks for lucrative property
development and other lending markets. By
mid-1972, the clearing banks were once again
restricted from lending in the property market.
Their competition, however, had forced the un-
supervised fringe banks to extend themselves
even farther into property markets and other
more speculative dealings. 14
When the ensuing monetary boom began to
manifest itself in rising inflation rates in 1973,
the Bank of England abandoned the Competi-
tion and Credit Control policy, re-imposed in-
terest rate ceilings, and introduced a form of
noninterest-bearing reserve requirement on the
clearing banks. IS The Bank also pursued a
tighter monetary policy that raised interest
rates.
The resulting fear of the effects of higher in-
terest rates on asset valuations ofproperty com-
panies and their creditors, as well as fear of a
rent freeze and a new development tax, gen-
erated considerable uncertainty in the property
market. In late 1973, a sizeable finance com-
pany collapsed and sparked a crisis in confi-
dencein the secondary banking sector. The
incident initiated a flight of funds from the un-
protected fringe to what was perceived as the
"safe haven" of the clearing banks.16
The Bank ofEngland recognized the need to
prevent the secondary bank crisis from affect-
ing the banking system proper and stepped in
to initiate a rescue operatiorl named "the Life-
boat".17 The Bank backed a group of clearillg
banks in essentially "recycling" deposits (orig-
inally withdrawn from the secondary banks)
back to illiquid fringe institutions. By 1974, the
number of troubled institutions had multiplied
as a result of the collapse of property values.
As the security (property) behind their lending
melted away, these institutions' debts mounted,
often at increasing interest rates. Consequently,
the overall cost of the lifeboat operation to the
Bank of England and the clearers was consid-
erable.18
II. Directions of Change in British Banking
We have discussed how a history of policy
decisions contributed to the concentrated and
segmented nature of the British banking indus-
try. British policy makers, like their American
counterparts, have attempted to achieve a
workable balance between soundness and vig-
orous competition within the banking industry,
assuming that vigorous competition alone
would lead to socially excessive levels of risk-
taking.19 The British historically have main-
tained this balance by restricting entry into
commercial banking, permitting coordinated
pricing and by tolerating the high concentration
of banking activity in a relatively few institu-
tions with which the Bank of England had a
productive, albeit informal, relationship.
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Events in the early 1970s, including the sec-
ondary banking crisis, revealed two basic flaws
in this strategy. First, the lack of complete cov-
erage ofportfolio and entry restrictions and su-
pervisory authority resulted in an inability to
protect the clearing banks from competition
from building societies and other non-bank de-
posit takers ("the secondary banks").2o Second,
as a consequence, the hoped-for protection of
the banking system from the destabilizing ef-
fects of excessive risk-taking on the part ()f in-
dividual financial institutions was not realized.
Indeed, the coexistence of an implicitly pro-
tected clearing bank sector and an unprotected
secondary banking sector actually may have ex-
aggerated the flight of deposits from the sec-ondary banks to the clearing banks that
necessitated the "lifeboat" operation in 1973.
In this section, we examine the modifications
in policy that have been used to redefine the
balance between soundness and competition in
British banking markets.
Changes in Supervisory Policy
After the initial responses to the secondary
banking crisis-abandoning Competition and
Credit Control policy and imposing other re-
strictive policies-British policymakers sought
legislation to extend the supervisory authority
of the Bank ofEngland to cover the previously
unregulated, secondary banking sector. They
achieved the extension with the passage of the
Banking Act of 1979. The Act extended the
supervisory authority of the Bank of England
to all deposit-taking institutions, with the ex-
ception of Building Societies, which remained
under the aegis of the Registrar of Friendly So-
cieties. All depository institutions thus were re-
quired to meet minimum managerial and
financial requirements and to file periodic state-
mentsof condition with the Bank of England.
This change represented a significant increase
in the·extent and formality of bank supervision
by the Bank ofEngland, although by American
standards, supervision remains relatively
tnild.21
The Banking Act of 1979 also sought to re-
emphasize the distinction between clearing
banks and other banking sectors by creating a
new category of institutions called "Licensed
Deposit Takers." This classification embraced
most ofwhat we have referred to above as sec-
ondary banking institutions. The rationale for
re-emphasizing this distinction was that, in the
public's mind, a true "bank" had come to be
regarded as an institution that enjoyed a special
and protected relationship with the Bank of
England. Indeed, given the historical exclusiv-
ity enjoyed by clearing banks, such perceptions
were probably not unrealistic.
In reaction to the events of the 1970s, British
policymakers also increased pressures to insti-
tute deposit insurance as a bulwark against runs
on deposit-taking institutions. Prior to the
1970s, neither government nor the financial in-
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dustry had expressed much interest in deposit
insurance. They relied instead on credit con-
trols and rate-setting cartels in the building so-
ciety and banking sectors to control potentially
destabilizing risk-taking.
However, as discipline in the building society
cartel deteriorated, the Building Societies As-
sociation independently devised a Voluntary
Depositor Protection Scheme to protect the in-
dustry from associations with individual socie-
ties weakened by excessive risk-taking. The
voluntary depositor protection scheme covers
100 percent of all deposits and 90 percent of all
shares in participating institutions. As of 1984,
over 80 percent of all building societies were
participating in the deposit insurance scheme,
with the result that over 95 percent of all shares
and deposits in the building society industry en-
joyed protection.22
The Banking Act had specified that banks
and other licensed deposit-takers be subject to
a compulsory deposit insurance plan. This plan,
which took effect in 1983, has features similar
to the programs administered by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpora-
tion (FSLIC) in the United States.23 It differs,
however, in several important respects. First,
the Compulsory Depositor Protection Scheme
insures only 75 percent of a depositor's funds
up to a maximum of 10,000 pounds sterling.
Thus, unlike its American counterparts, the
scheme is designed to provide protection only
for small depositors and, even then, to provide
them with an incentive to maintain active per-
sonal surveillance offinancial institutions, since
less than 100 percent of their deposits will be
recovered in the event of failure.
Second, the depositor protection scheme is
designed to function only as a first line of de-
fense against capricious runs initiated by un-
sophisticated investors. The Bank of England
and the clearing banks remain de facto, if not
de jure, the main sources ofemergency liquidity
in the British banking system. Indeed, the
clearing banks opposed the creation of the
Compulsory Depositor Protection Scheme pre-
cisely on the grounds that it afforded them no
relief from their responsibilities but requiredthem nevertheless to be major contributors to
the insurance fund. 24 In recent policy papers on
the Building Society industry, it has been rec-
ommended that the Compulsory Depositor
Protection Scheme currently in place be ex-
tended to the building society sector to replace
its current voluntary plan.
In summary, the debut of deposit insurance
and the extension of the Bank of England's su-
pervisory authority represent a move toward
less reliance on self-regulation and competitive
restraint as the means of bringing stability to
the U.K. banking system. Supervisory mecha-
nisms remain pro forma, however, in compar-
ison with the procedures followed in the United
States. In addition, the features of the Depos-
itor Protection Scheme (the low insured maxi-
mum and investor co-insurance) suggest that
British authorities still regard industry self-reg-
ulation, investor prudence and a strong clearing
bank sector as the main lines ofdefense against
financial instability.
Addressing the Competitive Balance
The new supervisory and insurance measures
signal a recognition on the part of British pol-
icymakers that the forces of competition fre-
quently regarded as potentially destabilizing in
banking markets are difficult to suppress. In
some ways, the clearing banks' loss of market
share to building societies and the secondary
banking sector in the 1960s and 1970s and the
Secondary Banking Crisis were to British pol-
icymakers what the cycles of disintermediation
and growth of money market mutual funds and
other "nonbanks" were to U.S. policymakers
in the same time period. Both sets of events
alerted policymakers to the strength of the
forces of financial innovation and the weakness
of extant regulatory devices. In the U.K., this
change in policy perception is manifested in a
number of significant changes in the competi-
tive "playing field" of British banking.
First, the Banking Act of 1979 provides a
mechanism by which a nonbanking institution
may formally enter the retail banking business.
The institution may become a retail bank, and
use the word "bank" in its corporate title, if it
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has operated successfully for a specified period
oftime, subject to approval by the Bank of
England.. (The British operations of a foreign
bank automatically are eligible for retail bank
status if they belong to a bonafide bankin their
home country.) This time provision represents
a relaxation offormer barriers to entry into the
demand deposit-taking, retail banking sector.
Current statistics of the Bank of England iden-
tify 140 institutions in the retail banking sector,
including in addition to former nonbanks, the
clearing·banks and subsidiaries of foreign
banks.25
A second, and perhaps more important,
concession to clearing bank competitors is the
granting of access to the Bankers' Clearing
House to entities otherthan the handful oforig-
inal clearing banks. A bank may gain access to
the Clearing House if it can demonstrate that
it handles one percent or more of total daily
payment volumes (thatis, checks and electronic
funds activity). Access to the clearing house is
particularly important for institutions wishing
to compete economically with the clearing
banks for demand deposit ("current account")
and credit card customers. The U.K. represen-
tatives oflarge foreign banks have been the first
to seek access to clearing facilities. Lack ofsuch
access-as well as the difficulty of establishing
de novo a branch system to rival the extensive
networks of the clearing banks-may explain
the difficulty foreign banks have had in com-
peting with clearing banks, despite their per-
ception of the market as a profitable one and
the availability of considerable resources from
their overseas parents.
The third major area of reform involves the
role ofthe building societies. Building societies
have been, and are likely to remain, the main
source of increased competition for clearing
banks. Unlike foreign banks and secondary
banks, the building societies have long-estab-
lished and extensiv~ branch networks through-
out the United Kingdom. The largest building
society has nearly 1,000 branches, and the
roughly 200 societies in existence have roughly
7,000 branches in total throughout the U.K.
This long reach provides the building societiesa geographically diversified clientele, familiar-
ity with local credit needs and conditions, and
name.recognition not enjoyed by clearing
banks' other potential competitors.26
Public policy toward building societies is
moving rapidly toward giving them the same
treatment as banks. In 1983, for example, leg-
islation was passed giving building societies
greatly improved access to wholesale deposit
markets. In addition, a variety of proposals
made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to
the Parliament in 1984 would give building so-
cieties certain powers now only enjoyed by
banks. Under the proposals, expected to be-
come law in 1987, building societies would, for
example, be able to invest up to 10 percent of
their assets in commercialloans.27
In addition, most of the current restrictions
on the provision ofmoney transmission services
by the building societies would be removed, al-
lowing them to offer, for example, point-of-sale
electronic debit services, automated funds
transfer on behalf of customers between insti-
tutions, check guarantee cards, and other ser-
vices. Relieving them from these restrictions
would substantially eliminate the competitive
disadvantage building societies have faced by
being unable to offer true demand deposit ser-
vices.28 In addition, it has been proposed that
building societies be permitted to sell insurance
products and offer real estate brokerage ser-
vices in addition to their traditional product
lines.
While giving societies certain bank powers,
public policy also is eliminating the preferential
tax treatment building societies have enjoyed.
The preferential treatment of building societies
under corporate tax law, for example, in es-
sence will have been eliminated by this year.29
The asymmetric treatment of interest paid to
depositors at building societies versus banks,
which many argued worked to the competitive
advantage of the building societies, also was
phased out this year.30
Building societies and banks already are re-
sponding to the existing and pending changes
in their competitive environment. Building so-
cieties formally abolished their interest-rate
cartel in 1984,andare now competing more
vigorously among themselves and with the
banking sector for deposits and mortgage as-
sets.31 The building societies also have begun
to explore the use of a shared automated teller
machine (ATM) network that could be ex-
panded to allow depositors to pay bills or trans-
fer funds. Some of the clearing banks also have
hastened to establish correspondent relation-
ships with the building societies. Through
"sweep"-type arrangements with clearing
banks, the building societies can provide check-
ing services to their customers.
The clearing banks, for their part, also are
reacting to the actual and potential increase in
competition by altering their price and service
strategies. In a sharp break with tradition, few
of the clearing banks are offering interest, for
example, on current account deposits. Some
also have extended banking hours, expanded
their customers' access to credit, and taken
steps to improve the efficiency of their internal
operations.32 Others are experimenting with
home electronic banking, point-of-sale debit
systems, and expanding their ATM networks
rapidly.
IU. Conclusions and Implications for U.S. Banking Policy
The attitude of British policymakers toward
their banking system has changed significantly
since the late 1960s. Generally speaking, they
have allowed and encouraged the British bank-
ing system to evolve toward one that permits
greater competition albeit with a deeper over-
lay of government supervision, insurance and
oversight. The previously informal nature of
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banking regulation-facilitated by the exis-
tence of interest rate cartels, restricted entry,
and fraternal relationships with the central
bank-appears to have been codified and for-
malized, although policymakers indicate a pref-
erence to retain some elements of "self-
regulation." In sum, relationships between the
banking community and the British centralbank are becoming increasingly more formal as
the competition for domestic markets has
grown more vigorous.
Whether the new regime will increase the
long-term efficiency of the British banking sec-
tor depends largely on whetherthe greater ef-
ficiency brought about by competition is offset
by greater public expenditures on supervising
and examining financial institutions. The latter
is needed to maintain the stability that has char-
acterized the British financial system through-
out most of this century. All that can be said at
this time is that the economic environment and
the pace of financial innovation have made it
impossible to ignore the role of competitive
forces in the U.K.
The British banking experience may inform
U.S. banking policy in a number ofways. First,
the British have learned that although it is pos-
sible to affect the structure of the financial in-
dustry through credit controls, portfolio
restrictions, and tax policy, competitive forces
run counter to attempts to manage credit flows.
For example, both rapid growth in the building
society industry and the existence of the sec-
ondary banking sector are, to a considerable
extent, the results of restrictions on clearing
bank activity and other credit allocation poli-
cies.33
Second, the U.K. has learned that banking
activities cannot remain segmented without the
appropriate economic conditions and stable
regulatory policy. When British policymakers
relaxed some of the controls on clearing banks
in 1971, the market found it difficult to adjust.
The change contributed to weakness in the sec-
ondary banking sector and eventually led to a
crisis of confidence in the entire payments
mechanism. It was not until nearly a decade
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later that deregulation in the British financial
system could safely resume.
Third, the British experience illustrates the
hazards of asymmetric treatment of like insti-
tutions concerning receipt of "protection" from
the centralbankorbenefitting from deposit in-
surance mechanisms. The coexistence of a
"protected" clearing bank sector and an "un-
protected" secondary banking sector that also
accepted deposits may have exacerbated· the
problems experienced by the secondary bank-
ingsector in 1971-1973 as depositors sought a
safe haven for their funds in the clearing banks.
British policymakers reacted, probably not in-
appropriately, by extending supervision and de-
positor protection mechanisms to virtually· all
depository institutions. The same problem may
arise in the United States given the presence of
unprotected or only privately insured deposi-
tory institutions in a few markets. Indeed, U.S.
policymakers appear to be reacting to these
cases by trying to extend insurance and super-
visory coverage to those institutions as well.
Finally, American observers of the British
banking system often cite its structure as an in-
dication of how U.S. banking might appear in
the absence of geographic branching restric-
tions and deposit rate regulation. In fact, as we
have pointed out, the structure and high levels
of concentration observed in the British bank-
ing industry are at least partly the result ofBrit-
ish banking and antitrust policy. While it is true
that British banking has developed without cer-
tain restrictive regulations imposed upon its
American counterpart, its structure also is
partly the consequence of attitudes toward
managing a perceived trade-off between com-
petition and payments system stability.FOOTNOTES
1. These other institutions include wholesale banks such
as merchant banks, foreign and consortia banks, and dis-
count houses. In addition, the British system includes sev-
eral deposit-taking institutions serving primarily small
indiVidual •• $av~n3 .•••These·••jncltJdethe.Trustee.Savings
Banks, the National Savings Bank, and the National Giro-
bank. For a comprehensive explanation of these institu-
tionssee Cooper, The Management and Regulation of
Banks.
2.Sinceacol1siderable portion of their deposit base is
made up of liquid retail deposits, the generally conservative
clearing banks have preferred to lend by overdraft, recall-
able at very short notice.
3. The Committee of London Clearing Bankers (CLCB) op-
eratesmost of the nation's cash distribution and money
transmission activities primarily through the Bankers'
Clearing House or the Automated Clearing Services, both
of which are owned by the London clearing banks.
4. These four major banks are: Barclays Bank, L10yds
Bank, Midland Bank and National Westminster Bank. Be-
sides these, there·are two other London clearing banks
(Coutts &Co. and Williams and Glyns Bank), three Scottish
clearing banks and four Irish clearing banks. The four major
London clearers own outright or have very substantial in-
terests in nine of the other clearing banks. Two of the Irish
clearing banks are independent. The Committee of London
Clearing Bankers will be supplanted in the near future by
an enlarged trade group to be known as the Committee of
London and Scotland bankers. This new group initially will
have seven members, all of whom were members of the
London or Scottish Committees of clearing banks.
By way of comparison, even U.S. state-level 4-firm con-
centration ratios are nowhere near this high. In 1984, for
example, California-which permits statewide branching
and comprises a large economy itself-hadover 450 banks
and a 4-firm concentration ratio oUess than 64 percent.
The5-firm, 55 percent concentration ratio observed among
building societies in Great Britain, however, more closely
matches U.S. experience. In California, for example, there
are approximately 200 savings and loan associations (and
no other mortgage lenders such as mutual savings banks),
and the 5-firm concentration ratio is 40 percent.
5. In the past, this cooperation has frequently taken the
form of clearing bank compliance with directives by Bank
of England on such issues as the volume and direction of
bank lending am:! the composition ofbalance sheets.
6. The Bank Act of 1844, introduced by the Bank of Eng-
land and repealed in less than 15 years, temporarily re-
stricted entry to the British banking industry. Already-
existing banks-many the forebears of the main contem-
porary clearing banks-were consequently sheltered from
competition for a period of time. This period of relative free-
dom, enhanced by the advantages of acceptance into the
Committee of London Clearing Bankers in 1854, allowed
those banks to entrench themselves in the banking sector
at the expense of any competitors. William T. McCaffrey,
English and American Banking Systems Compared, pp.
28-29.
7. One example of such collusive pricing behavior was
later to become a competitive disadvantage, as discussed
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below. For many years, the cartel made the interest rate
paid on noncheckable deposits two percentage points be-
low Bank Rate, or the Bank of England's lending rate
(somewhat like the Federal Reserve Bank's discount rate).
LikeWise,borrbWerspaidaset.rateabol(eBar"lkRafe.
8. For example, during the post-war period, on the Bank
of England's recommendation, the. clearing banks chan-
neled their lending into the rebuilding of the industrial sec-
tor-a policy that was to affect the entire banking system
considerably, as discussed below.
9. This process was facilitated by the social homogeneity
of both clearing bankers and the Directors of the Bank of
England. They belonged to the same class, attended the
same schools, or met at the same clubs.
10. Cartels in the financial industry may have functioned
as an alternative to regulation in that they have attempted
to regulate interest rates to achieve a lower risk, lower
return equilibrium in loan portfolios. (See "Building Socie-
ties: A New Framework, p. 27).
11. Building societies are analogous, in this sense, to mu-
tual. savings banks in the United States.
12. In the 1970s, in an environment of high interest rates,
a few very large building societies broke away from the
cartel, threatening its risk-optimizing function. Discipline
continued to erode until, in 1984, the interest rate cartel
officially was abandoned although the BUilding Societies
Association continues to publish recommended deposit
and mortgage rates.
13 Many of the secondary banks possessed certificates,
issued by the Board of Trade, stating that they engaged in
bona fide banking busine$s for the narrow purpose of ex-
empting these institutions from the Money Lenders Act of
1900. This certification created the illusion that the com-
panies were recognized by a responsible government de-
partment.
14. MK Lewis and B. Chiplin, De-Regulation and Com-
petitive PressUres upon British Banks.
15. In September 1973, the Bank of England imposed a
ceiling of 9.5 percent per annum on interest thatcould be
paid on bank deposits of less than £10,000. This ceiling
was withdrawn in February 1975. The Supplementary Spe-
cial Deposits Scheme, or the "corset", put up to 50 percent
of deposit increases into noninterest bearing reserves and
constituted an important tool of British monetary policy dur-
ing thatperiod.
16. See Margaret Reid, The Secondary Banking Crisis,
1973-75.
17. "While the U.K. clearing banks appeared secure from
the domestic effects of any run, their international exposure
was such that the risk to external confidence was a matter
of concern for themselves as well as for the Bank." (Bank
of England, ''The Secondary Banking Crisis...")
18. The recycled deposits were "loaned" at a market rate
of interest plus a premium for the perceived riskiness of
the loan. The Bank of England agreed to assume respon-
sibility for financing 10 percent of the amounts outstanding.
Although no precise data are available, it has been esti-
mated that the total financing of the Lifeboat amounted to
about £3 billion. Losses from the operation could havebeen as much as £50 million for the clearing banks and
£100 million for the Bank of England. Reid, op. cit., pp.
190-92.
19. This notion rests on the view that runs on essentially
sound institutions can occur as the result of the failure of
similar institutions. Risk-taking that is rational from an in-
dividualinstitution'spointofview may impose costs•inthe
form of increased risk of failure on other institutions.
20. Indeed, the Competition and Credit Control policy that
some feel precipitated the secondary banking crisis was
im,tituted partly to redress the diminishing dominance of
the clearing banks. (See Lewis and Chiplin's account of
this policy.)
21. The Bank of England, for example, does notconduct
on-site or surprise examinations as do the supervisory au-
thorities in the United States. It relies instead on a rather
arms-length review of the submitted reports of condition.
In recent months, these have been argued to be insuffi-
cient. (See "A Juicy Summer Scandal is Rocking the City
of London," Business Week, August 19,1985, page 44.)
22. The Depositor Protection Scheme employed by the
building societies was enabled by permissive language in
the 1962 Building Societies Act. The Scheme is run by the
Building Societies Association (BSA), although participa-
tion is not reserved to BSA members or participants in the
BSA cartel.
23. The Depositor Protection Scheme in Britain is funded
by a fee based. upon the level of short-term deposits at
each institution, with stipulations for a minimum and max-
imum contribution. It is administered by a special commis-
sion composed of representatives from the Bank of
England and affected sectors of the financial industry.
24. The clearing banks recalled the burden imposed upon
them by the "lifeboat" operation begun in 1973. Their feel-
ing was that, should amajor banking panic occur, they once
again would be called upon to shoulder a large portion of
the burden of re-establishing stability in the banking sys-
tem. The proposals for reforming the building societies are
presented in a so-called "Green Paper" titled "Building So-
cieties: A New Framework," presented to Parliament by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, July 1984.
25. No statistics are available on the size of the licensed
deposit-taker institutions that have not achieved retail bank
status. Conversations with experts on British Banking sug-
gest, however, that the conversion of licensed deposit-tak-
ers to retail banks has not been rapid.
26. These factors, combined with preferential tax treat-
ment of interest earned at building societies, caused the
share of building society deposits relative to deposits at
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clearing banks to rise from approximately 50 percent in
1965 to 90 percent in 1975.
27.• Currently, approximately 80 percent of building society
assets arein mortgage loans; the.remainder is invested in
liquid and other securities.
28. Some building societies employ "sweep"-type ar-
rangementswithclearing banks to provide their customers
with checking-like services.
29. Building society corporations traditionally faced a 40
percent tax rate on corporate profits, whereas banks faced
a 52percEmtta~ rate.. However, banks were able to.reduce
their corporate tax liability through leasing activities notal-
lowed building societies. In 1984, pOlicymakers consider-
ably reduced the tax advantages enjoyed by leasing
operations and began a progressive reduction ofthe cor-
porate tax rate to 35 percent-applied uniformly to banks
and building societies. In addition, the building societies'
ability to count income from the sale of certain .types of
securities as capital gainsrather than ordinary income was
eliminated in 1984.
30. Prior to 1985, building societies paid interest to inves-
tors net of a composite tax rate, which was slightly lower
than the. basic income tax rate. Interest payments by clear-
ing banks, in contrast, were paid gross of tax, subjecting
the taxpayer to the basic rate and, thus, a lower after-tax
rate ofretum, ceteris paribus.
31. Clearing banks traditionally had not involved them-
selves in the residential mortgage market. As recently as
1980, their loan portfolios contained essentially no mort-
gage assets. Since BSA policy frequently kept mortgages
issued by building societies in short supply, the absence
of clearing banks from the mortgage market must not have
been a matter of choice but the result of credit restrictions
imposed on clearing banks by the Bank of England. Today,
the clearing banks hold approximately 5 percent of their
assets inthe form of mortgages.
32. The Clearing House Automated Payment System
(CHAPS), for example, will facilitate the interbank transfer
of sterling funds.
33. in terms of deposits, building societies and clearing
banks in Britain today are virtually identical in size. By com-
parison, savings and loan associations, an American coun"
terpart to the building society, have deposits equal to only
about one-third of the deposits of commercial banks. Thus,
a much greater share of total deposits in Great Britain re-
sides with highly undiversified, mortgage-oriented financial
institutions. Some argue that this places the British finan-
cial system in greater jeopardy should some systemic prob-
lem affect the quality of mortgage loan assets.REFERENCES
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